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e3 I9 a
any federal Indian law professors have experienced
some version of the following: We go to a law school to
give a workshop on a specific aspect of federal Indian
law and get a question along the lines of "Why should
there be tribes?" One might compare it to giving a talk on a specific
aspect of constitutional or international law and getting the question
"Why should there be the United States?" These are interesting phil-
osophical questions, and even worth asking in some settings. But fo-
cusing on them makes it hard to get to issues that have to be resolved
in the present day. This experience-of having to justify an entire field
and the continued political existence of hundreds of distinct govern-
ments-is a symptom of the broader problem. The law affecting Na-
tive American people often doesn't make sense to lawyers in other
fields, and a not-uncommon reaction to the lack of understanding is
to ask whether the fundamental rules of the field should exist at all.
So the most important fact in conveying the distinctive questions
of diversity affecting Native people in the United States is that there
are Indian tribes, and their sovereignty is recognized by law. This has
been true since before the U.S. Constitution placed "commerce ...
with the Indian tribes" alongside commerce with "foreign nations"
and among "the several states" among Congress' powers in Article
1. It was true when George Washington and the first U.S. Congress
determined that treaties with Indian tribes had to be approved in the
same manner as treaties with foreign nations. It remained true when
subsequent congresses negotiated more than 200 treaties with tribal
governments. It is still true today, as dozens of recent statutes, exec-
utive orders, and regulations seek to strengthen tribal governments
and deal with them through sovereign-to-sovereign relationships.'
That's not to say that policymakers have always agreed that tribes
should continue. Different federal policy initiatives from the 1800s
through to the 1960s sought to end the existence of Indian tribes.
Each time, these initiatives ended with policymakers' recognition
that they only made Indian people poorer and made dealing with
the tribes' nations that stubbornly persisted in existing tougher. So,
for at least three decades, U.S. policy has officially recognized that
strengthening tribes, not destroying them, is one necessary part of
addressing the continuing hardships of Indian people.
A somewhat more modern rationale for the "Why are there
tribes?" question is particularly relevant to diversity. It is the concern
that federal Indian law is basically racist because it treats people and
groups differently because of their race. Understanding the govern-
mental status of tribes helps to address part of this concern: Most of
the classifications of federal Indian law are recognitions of the polit-
ical status of Indian peoples, not their racial status. Understanding
the history behind this reality helps respond to this concern as well:
Some of the most racist policies toward American Indians sought to
deny and destroy tribal governmental status, treat Indians only as
individuals with different ethnic heritages, and therefore forcibly as-
similate them in non-Indian society. The rest of this article explains
these differences and what they mean for policy and law.
So Who Is an Indian Anyway?
At the Wounded Knee trial, the story goes, the U.S. Attorney was
cross-examining Standing Rock Sioux scholar Vine Deloria Jr. The
attorney tried to show his liberal credentials by asking Deloria what
he would like to be called-Standing Rock Sioux, Native American,
or indigenous-because he knew Indians were only called Indians
because Columbus was looking for India. Deloria responded, "Well,
we've always been happy he wasn't looking for Turkey." The jury
laughed, and that was the end of his cross.'
The point? Don't get too distracted by terminology. This article
alternates between the terms Indian, American Indian, Native, indig-
enous, and Native American. Native or indigenous are arguably most
accurate because they include Alaska Natives and Native Hawaiians
(some of whom reject the term Native American). Among collective
nouns, though, Indian or American Indian are most common in law.
They also tend to be common in Native communities in the conti-
nental United States (perhaps reflecting a continuing joke on the
successors to Columbus).
Still, the confusion over terminology reflects a more important
difficulty when it comes to defining diversity for Native people. The
reality is that Indian is defined differently in different contexts. Many
of these definitions do not closely track what we think of as race. Fe-
lix Cohen recognized long ago that "[f]rom a legal standpoint ... the
biological question of race is generally pertinent, but not conclusive.
Legal status depends not only upon biological, but also upon social
factors, such as the relation of the individual concerned to a white
or Indian community. This relationship, in turn, has two ends-an
individual and a community."'
In federal Indian law, the most common definition of Indian is
that the person (1) is recognized as part of an Indian tribe, (2) which
itself is recognized by the federal government, and (3) also has some
heritage from the peoples who were here before European settle-
ment. People with these characteristics will be treated as Indians for
most tests for jurisdiction and government services. But such people
may be primarily white, black, Asian, or some combination of these.
They may well not seem "racially" Indian.
People who are Indian by this commonly accepted measure may
be challenged for being not Indian enough. Protesters against treaty
fishing in Wisconsin combined clearly racist statements-calling the
Ojibwa fishers "timber n-ers" and "welfare warriors" and declaring
"save a walleye, spear a Squaw"-with others decrying them as in-
sufficiently Indian. Protesters chanted "a half breed here, a half breed
there" to the tune of Old MacDonald, and denounced the mixed-
blood leader of the protests as being "nothing but a f-ing Jew."' Op-
ponents of gaming by the Mashantucket Pequots in Connecticut have
complained that they are mostly black or white, not real Indians.' In
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,' concerning the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA), the U.S. Supreme Court focused on the slight racial her-
itage of the little girl and her Cherokee father, not the fact that the
father and his parents lived within the Cherokee Nation's jurisdic-
tional area, voted in Cherokee elections, observed Cherokee holidays,
and owned land held in trust for Cherokees.' In less-fraught contexts
as well, people who do not appear Indian may be suspected of being
"wannabes," and asked to prove their Indian credentials.
People may also be Indian for some legal purposes without any
Indian heritage at all. If a tribe chooses to admit people without in-
digenous heritage for membership, those people should be treated
as Indians for common law tests of tribal and state jurisdiction, as
well as for the federal statutory test under ICWA. Certain descen-
dants of African-American slaves of the Seminole and Cherokee
tribes may be recognized as citizens of those tribes and legally Indi-
an, even if they have no Indian blood. While most tribes don't include
non-Indians in official citizenship criteria, some admit non-Indians
to citizenship on an ad hoc basis. One South Dakota Supreme Court
case, for example, concerned a Caucasian girl who had been adopted
JUNE 2015 * THE FEDERAL LAWYER * 55
by her Cheyenne River Sioux stepfather and enrolled with the tribe.'
The court held that, as an enrolled tribal member, the girl was an
"Indian child" for purposes of ICWA.9 In another case, the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court held that non-Navajos who had married with-
in the tribe were hadane, or in-law members, and were therefore
subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction.10
The existing measures also exclude people who are Indian in
many ways. Individuals with significant heritage who live in a tribal
community may not be considered Indian for all purposes if they
are not enrolled or eligible to enroll in a particular tribe. Similarly,
individuals whose tribes are not officially recognized by the federal
government, including tribes with long and well-established histo-
ries like the Lumbee of North Carolina and the Houma of Louisiana,
are not Indian for mostly legal purposes. Many of these people would
be perceived as racially Indian. Many may also have strong cultural
connections to their tribes. Yet although they fit within many accept-
ed definitions of Indian status, they are not politically Indian under
federal law.
becausem I
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One fascinating Title VII case dealt wit
termining Indian status. In Perkins v. Lak
of Utilities, " Arthur Perkins alleged that h
motions, paid less, and subjected to derogat
was American Indian. In response, the defen
who found that he was not documented as
tribe and that his ancestors had always been
or mulatto. Perkins and his parents, howev
to be American Indian, and they came from
ana sometimes called "redbones," indicating
Indian heritage. His co-workers also believe
employer recorded his race as being Indian.
After discussing the "amorphous and subje
sification in general," the court declared that "w
is involved[,] perception and appearance are
"difficulty, perhaps even the impossibility wi
establishing unquestionable genetic/heredi
court found, "[a]s far as designation of indiv
cans is concerned, there is no hard and fast
not need to show tribal membership, blood
of the tests in other contexts for Indian stat
was show that the employer had a "reasor
"objective basis" that he was Indian." Havi
himself out as Indian, may have appeared I
by his employer to be Indian was sufficient t
member of a protected class for Title VII.
In short, Indian is sometimes a racial stat
status, and sometimes a combination of the
may differ from community identification, ai
legal identification. Definitions of Indian dep
may lead to surprising results.
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Racism and American Indians
In addition to questions of who is considered Indian, understand-
ing diversity requires understanding the distinctive manifestations
of racism for Native Americans. Racism often looks different when it
comes to American Indians and other indigenous Americans. Don't
get me wrong: Indians have experienced lots of plain vanilla rac-
ism. As discussed in Mary Smith's March Federal Lawyer article,
a recent survey of 527 Native American lawyers found that 40 per-
cent had experienced demeaning comments or harassment based
on their race, ethnicity, or tribal status, and 37 percent had experi-
enced discrimination. Until the 1950s, state law barred Indians from
voting in several states, and many Indians, particularly those living
near border towns, have been turned away from non-Indian-run ho-
tels and restaurants because of their race. Today, older anti-Indian
stereotypes of alcoholism and welfare dependence have been joined
by new ones of universal casino wealth and fake claims to Indi-
an-ness. And because Indians are tiny fractions of the population-
only about 1 percent of all people in the United States, and only 0.2
percent of all lawyers-
i n e tiny. fractions of: e there is rarely a critical
hF mass able to overcome
these stereotypes.
a o iy 0.2 perent ofail But the distinctive
rarely acrit ass h to history of Indian-white
relations means that
tereotypes. the symptoms of racism
are often flipped. The
h the difficulties of de- core of America's "Indian problem" was how to end Indian claims
e County Department to land and legal independence. The solution to the problem was to
e had been denied pro- end the existence of Indian tribes, and the way to do that was to end
ory remarks because he the connections between Indian people and their tribes. One meth-
dants hired genealogists od was to simply klll Indian people. As General John Chivington said
)eing part of any known in ordering the 1864 massacre of peaceful Cheyenne at Sand Creek,
recorded as being white "Ki and scalp all, big and little; nits make bee." But the dominant
er, believed themselves method-and the only way accepted as official federal policy-was
a community in Louisi- to assimilate Indians.
mixed white, black, and As a result, very few states passed laws barring Indian-white
d he was Indian, and his marriages, and in 1888, Congress even passed a law rewarding with
U.S. citizenship Indian women who married whidte men. A painting of
ctive nature of racial clas- Pocahontas' conversion and marriage to John Roife was hung in the
Then racial discrimination Capitol rotunda in 1834 and featured on the 1875 $20 bill. Successful
everything. "12 Given the examples of assimlation were welcomed, even celebrated, in many
th Native Americans, of settings from which African-Americans and -Asians were excluded.
tary classification," the Indian ball players played on both sides in the 1910 World Series,
iduals as Native Ameri- for example, four decades before Jackie Robinson roke the black-
rule." The plaintiff did white color line. But this assimilation was celebrated in part because
quantum, or satisfy any it meant the end of people connected to Indian tribes, and therefore
us. All he needed to do the end of tribes themselves. It was also furthered by clearly racist
able belief" with some policies. The policies of this period included the forcible division of
ng shown that he held reservations among individual Indians and railroads and non-Indian
idian, and was believed settlers, and the confinement of Indian children in federal boarding
o establish that he was a schools designed to "kill the Indian ... to save the man."
In light of this history, focusing on the symptoms of racism fa-
is, sometimes a political miliar from other contexts can lead to backward results. Here is one
two. Self-identification recent example: In Adoptive Couple v. Bobp Girl," the Supreme
nd both may differ from Court held that ICWA did not prevent a little girl from being removed
end on the context and from her Cherokee father and placed with the white couple who
wanted to adopt her. Although the case ostensibly turned on stat-
Ad Stat
utory construction, the majority was clearly concerned that Baby
Girl just wasn't Indian enough. The majority opinion began with this
line: "This case is about a little girl (Baby Girl) who is classified as
an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee."16 It later declared,
"It is undisputed that, had Baby Girl not been 3/256 Cherokee, Bi-
ological Father would have had no right to object to her adoption
under South Carolina law."" Neither statement was true. Baby Girl
and her father had rights under ICWA because he was a citizen of the
Cherokee Nation and she was eligible for tribal citizenship. Degree of
Cherokee blood is irrelevant to Cherokee citizenship; all that matters
is that she could trace her descent to the members of the tribe in the
early 1900s.
Phrasing it as the Court did makes applying ICWA to Baby Girl
look like the old one-drop rule some states used to insist that mul-
tiracial people were black and could be targeted for discrimination.
Understanding Indian history reveals that the Court's decision con-
tinued an equally old and racist practice: deciding that intermar-
riage and assimilation denied individuals the political rights of In-
dians. The justices' comments during oral arguments showed this
belief. Chief Justice John Roberts worried that tribes might estab-
lish "a zero percent blood requirement; they're open for, you know,
people who want to apply, who think culturally they're a Chero-
kee." Justice Samuel Alito, who wrote the majority opinion, was
troubled that a tribe might make "eligibility available for anybody
who, as a result of a DNA test, can establish any Indian ancestry,
no matter how slight."" These justices aren't trying to make race
less important in Indian law-they want it to be more important.
The result: Only a small, insulated group can assert the rights of
Indians. The problem with Baby Girl and her father, in this light, is
that they weren't racially Indian enough. As a result, Baby Girl was
taken from the father she loved and away from his home in Chero-
kee country in Oklahoma.
Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law
One might think that constitutional law would struggle with the
distinct meanings of race in the Indian context. But, in fact, equal pro-
tection jurisprudence recognizes that much of Indian law is about the
political relationships between the United States and Indian peoples.
In the early days of reverse discrimination lawsuits, the Supreme
Court decided Morton v. Mancari." The suit challenged the statu-
tory federal preference for
Indians in the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA). The
Court rejected the chal-
lenge, refusing to subject
the preference to the strict
scrutiny generally applied
to racial classifications.
The Court reviewed the
The BIA preference in Mancari met this test because it was
"granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities
are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion."" Given the "sui ge-
neris" status of the BIA, the preference rationally aligned the gover-
nors with the governed, like a requirement that elected officials are
drawn from the districts they represent."
The Mancari formulation has survived the growth of strict scru-
tiny for affirmative action. The Supreme Court last revisited the
Mancari formulation in 2000 in Rice v. Cayetano.21 The Rice Court
held that Mancari did not apply to a 15th-amendment challenge to
a provision restricting voting to Native Hawaiians in a state election
for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed
that "as we have established in a series of cases, Congress may fulfill
its treaty obligations and its responsibilities to the Indian tribes by
enacting legislation dedicated to their circumstances and needs.""
Under current equal protection law then, federal actions in fur-
therance of the distinct obligations of the United States to Indians
and tribes are subject to rational basis review. These actions are not
limited to those implementing specific treaties or tribal agreements.
It includes, for example, statutes like the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, which seek to enhance economic development on reservations,
and those regarding Indian education, which seek not only to make
good on historical commitments to provide education but also to ad-
dress generations of harm from federal education policies.
The Mancari test does not mean that "Indian" cannot be a racial
status for equal protection purposes. The Mancari Court suggested
that a preference for Indians in all federal jobs would be more sus-
pect.6 A law requiring that members of Indian tribes ride in segre-
gated train cars would clearly be invalid. Because all Indians are now
citizens under federal law, moreover, states may not use Indians' tribal
affiliations to deny them the right to vote or to deny Indians services
generally available to state citizens. Mancari simply means that, de-
spite the reality that Indians usually have a distinct racial heritage,
equal protection law is not intended to undermine the longstanding
U.S.-tribal relationship or the federal obligations arising from it.
This constitutional consensus is not without challengers. Litigants
have argued, for example, that equal protection prevents states from
permitting tribal members to exercise treaty rights to fish off-reser-
vation without state regulation. More recently they have challenged
"Because all Indians are now citizens under
federal law, moreover, states my not use
Indians' tribal affiliations to eny them the
right to vote or to deny Indians services
generally available to state citizens."
long historical relationship
between tribes and the United States, the numerous treaties cre- state laws granting tribes exclusive rights to engage in gambling under
ating solemn federal commitments to Indians, and the commerce the Indian Garalng Regulatory Act. Equal protection concerns have
clause's singling out of tribes as a special subject for legislation. As also delayed or defeated self-determination legislation in Congress,
a result of these, the Court found, Indian tribes had a "unique legal including efforts to recognize governmental rights in Native Hawai-
status" and Congress had "plenary power ... to legislate on [their] ians and to recognize tribal rights to punish non-Indian perpetrators
behalf."" The Court held that "[as long as the special treatment can of domestic violence against Indian women on reservations. But no
be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation to- court has upheld the challengers' efforts to undermine the Mancari
ward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed." formulation.
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Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl provides a useful example here as
well. Superstar appellate litigator Paul Clement, appearing as amicus
curiae, argued hard that applying ICWA to the case would be uncon-
stitutional, and the Supreme Court stated obliquely that its interpre-
tation of the statute avoided "equal protection concerns." 7 But ICWA
and its application to Baby Girl are both valid under the established
test. First, ICWA applied to Baby Girl not because of her race but
because of her father's citizenship in the Cherokee Nation and her
own eligibility for citizenship. Second, the measures that would have
been required under ICWA fall well within Congress' unique obliga-
tions to the Indians. In Adoptive Couple, the birth mother told the
birth father that she wanted to raise Baby Girl on her own, refused
his attempts to contact her, and concealed her adoption plans until
Baby Girl had been living with proposed couple for four months."
Had all of ICWAs requirements applied, the biological father would
have had to get notice of any proposed adoption, available place-
ments with Baby Girl's extended family and other Cherokee families
would have gotten preference, and his parental rights could not have
been terminated unless it was shown that his custody would have
been harmful to Baby Girl.29 All of these requirements are rationally
related to unique federal obligations to Indian peoples: correcting
the casual removal of children from Indian communities that the fed-
eral government actively encouraged from Colonial times through to
the 1960s and helping those communities to maintain contact with
their future generations.
Conclusion
Native people face many of the diversity challenges facing other
people of color, people from different cultures, and people living in
extreme poverty. But they also face distinctive challenges, challeng-
es rooted in their unique histories and status as formerly autono-
mous peoples in what is now the United States. The reaction to this
distinct status is sometimes to declare it incoherent and racist, and
even to seek to stamp it out. In the 1950s, Felix Cohen commented
on yet another policy seeking to terminate the existence of Indian
tribes in the name of coherence and equality:
[T]he Indian plays much the same role in our American
society that the Jews played in Germany. Like the miner's ca-
nary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh air to poison gas in
our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even
more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise
and fall in our democratic faith.30
Cohen recognized that Indian peoples' claims made respecting
their rights distinctly challenging. The extent to which the United
States met this challenge, he saw, was a crucial test of our commit-
ment to diversity, equality, and, ultimately, our democratic faith. (
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